European leaders entered a pivotal March 2025 summit in Brussels confronting two closely connected questions: how to sustain Ukraine as U.S. policy under President Donald Trump shifted, and how to strengthen Europe's own military capabilities over the longer term.
The special European Council on March 6 brought together the leaders of the European Union's 27 member states. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy also joined the opening discussions. The meeting came after a rapid series of European diplomatic and defense consultations prompted by uncertainty over Washington's approach to the war and the future shape of European security.
Ukraine and Europe's Role in Any Peace Process
One of the central issues was Europe's place in negotiations intended to end Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The European Council said after the meeting that 26 of the EU's 27 national leaders firmly supported a set of principles for a future peace process.
Those principles included that negotiations on Ukraine should not take place without Ukraine and that negotiations affecting European security should involve Europe. The leaders also said a ceasefire should form part of a process leading toward a comprehensive peace agreement, and that any settlement should be accompanied by credible security guarantees for Ukraine.
The lack of unanimity reflected continuing differences inside the EU. Hungary's Prime Minister Viktor Orbán did not join the other 26 leaders in backing the Ukraine text, illustrating that the bloc's broad support for Kyiv did not eliminate disagreements over how the war should be handled.
The March summit followed an especially turbulent period in U.S.-Ukraine relations. After the contentious February 28 meeting between Trump and Zelenskyy at the White House, the United States paused military assistance and intelligence sharing with Ukraine. The interruption was significant for Kyiv because European military support, although substantial, could not immediately duplicate every U.S. capability.
A Rapidly Changing Diplomatic Track
At the time of the Brussels meeting, the next steps in U.S.-led diplomacy remained uncertain. Zelenskyy had publicly signaled that Ukraine was prepared to work with the Trump administration on steps toward ending the war, while European governments sought to ensure that Kyiv and Europe retained a meaningful role in negotiations affecting their security.
That diplomatic picture changed again only days later. On March 11, U.S. and Ukrainian delegations met in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. According to their joint statement, Ukraine accepted a U.S. proposal for an interim 30-day ceasefire provided Russia also accepted and implemented it. Washington, in turn, immediately lifted its pause on intelligence sharing and resumed security assistance to Ukraine.
The Jeddah statement also said European partners should be involved in the peace process, reinforcing one of the central concerns European leaders had expressed in Brussels.
Europe Moves to Increase Defense Spending
The summit was not solely about Ukraine. EU leaders also confronted a broader question: whether Europe had sufficient military capacity to take greater responsibility for its own defense.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen had presented the outlines of the ReArm Europe initiative shortly before the summit. Rather than constituting a single €800 billion EU defense fund, the proposal combined several financial mechanisms intended to enable significantly greater defense investment.
One component was a proposed EU-backed lending instrument of up to €150 billion for member states investing in areas such as air and missile defense, artillery, missiles and ammunition, drones and anti-drone systems, cyber capabilities, and military mobility.
Another component involved greater flexibility under EU fiscal rules. The Commission estimated that if member states increased defense spending by an average of 1.5% of GDP, the mechanism could create close to €650 billion in additional fiscal space over four years. Together with other EU-budget, European Investment Bank, and private-capital measures, the Commission said the broader plan could mobilize close to €800 billion.
The European Council's defense conclusions endorsed the direction of that effort, calling for substantially higher security and defense expenditure and identifying priority capability gaps including air and missile defense, artillery, ammunition, drones, military mobility, cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, and electronic warfare.
European Defense Does Not Mean Abandoning NATO
The push for greater European military capacity was not formally presented as a replacement for NATO. EU leaders explicitly stated that a stronger European defense role should complement the alliance and reaffirmed that NATO remained the foundation of collective defense for EU countries that are members of it.
That distinction is important. The debate in Brussels centered on reducing critical dependencies, expanding Europe's defense-industrial capacity, and enabling European countries to contribute more effectively to their own security—not on creating an immediate substitute for NATO's collective-defense structure.
The EU also emphasized cooperation with like-minded countries outside the bloc, a potentially important feature because major European security partners such as the United Kingdom and Norway are not EU members.
Macron Opens a Debate Over France's Nuclear Deterrent
France added another dimension to the security debate. In a March 5 address, President Emmanuel Macron announced that he would open a strategic discussion about whether France's nuclear deterrent could play a broader role in protecting European allies.
Macron emphasized that France's nuclear force would remain sovereign and that decisions concerning its use would remain with the French president. His announcement therefore opened a strategic debate rather than establishing a new European nuclear-defense arrangement.
France is the EU's only nuclear-armed state following the United Kingdom's departure from the bloc, giving the discussion particular significance as European governments reconsider the balance between national capabilities, EU defense initiatives, and NATO deterrence.
What the March Summit Actually Changed
The March 6 meeting did not create a European army, replace NATO, or produce a final peace settlement for Ukraine. It did, however, mark an acceleration of policies that had been developing since Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022.
EU leaders committed themselves to substantially increasing defense readiness, expanding European weapons-production capacity, facilitating higher national defense spending, and pursuing more joint procurement. They also maintained that Ukraine should participate in negotiations concerning its future and that Europe should be involved when negotiations affect European security.
Later developments clarified some proposals that were still taking shape during the summit. The Commission subsequently developed ReArm Europe into the broader ReArm Europe Plan/Readiness 2030, while the €150 billion lending component became the Security Action for Europe, or SAFE, instrument. The Council adopted SAFE in May 2025.
The larger strategic question remained unresolved: how much responsibility Europe could assume for its own defense while preserving the transatlantic alliance and continuing to support Ukraine. The March 2025 summit demonstrated that EU governments were preparing to devote substantially greater political and financial resources to that challenge, even as disagreements persisted over Ukraine policy and the precise form Europe's future security architecture should take.
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