Colombia entered a severe new phase of its long-running armed conflicts in 2025 as fighting among guerrilla factions, FARC dissident groups and state forces intensified in several regions. The deterioration posed a major challenge to then-President Gustavo Petro's "Total Peace" policy, which sought negotiated settlements with multiple armed organizations while combining dialogue with territorial development and security measures.
The crisis did not have a single cause, and evidence does not establish that the peace policy itself created Colombia's armed groups or drug economy. Fragmentation after the 2016 peace agreement, competition over illicit economies, weak state presence in some rural areas and disputes among armed organizations all contributed. By July 2025, the International Committee of the Red Cross warned that the country's humanitarian situation was on course to become its worst in a decade.
August 2025 Attacks Highlight a Changing Security Threat
Two major attacks on August 21, 2025 underscored the scale of the security challenge. In Amalfi, Antioquia, a Colombian National Police Black Hawk helicopter participating in a coca-eradication operation was brought down, killing 12 police officers. Colombian authorities attributed the attack to a FARC dissident faction.
Hours later, an explosives-laden vehicle detonated near the Marco Fidel Suárez aerospace facility in Cali. Six people were killed and dozens were injured. Authorities also attributed that attack to FARC dissidents. The two incidents killed at least 18 people in total.
The helicopter attack drew particular attention to armed groups' increasing use of drones and other explosive systems. The ICRC had already documented growing risks from explosive devices during Colombia's conflicts, while cautioning that the humanitarian consequences varied considerably by region and actor.
What Happened to Petro's "Total Peace" Strategy?
Petro entered office in 2022 promising to pursue what his government called "Total Peace": a broad effort to negotiate with guerrilla organizations and other armed groups rather than rely exclusively on military pressure. The approach included talks with the National Liberation Army (ELN), engagement with factions descended from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and efforts to expand state services and economic alternatives in conflict-affected territories.
The process produced uneven results. Some negotiations advanced locally, while others stalled, fragmented or collapsed. Ceasefires with certain groups ended, allowing hostilities between security forces and armed organizations to resume. The ICRC reported that armed groups had also fragmented and reconfigured, intensifying territorial disputes and increasing pressure on civilians.
That record made sweeping claims that negotiations alone had caused Colombia's violence difficult to substantiate. What was clear by 2025 was that the government had struggled to convert negotiations into durable security improvements across many contested territories.
FARC Dissident Groups Remain Fragmented
The 2016 peace agreement between the Colombian government and the FARC led thousands of combatants to demobilize, but some commanders and fighters rejected the agreement or later returned to armed activity. The organizations commonly described as FARC dissidents subsequently fragmented into competing structures rather than operating as a single unified successor to the former guerrilla organization.
These factions became involved in territorial struggles connected to coca-growing zones, trafficking corridors, illegal mining, extortion and other illicit economies. Their relationships with the government also diverged: some participated in negotiations while others continued or intensified armed operations.
This fragmentation complicated the government's peace strategy because agreements with one faction did not necessarily bind another, and internal divisions could alter negotiating structures or create new armed rivalries.
Catatumbo Crisis Derails ELN Peace Talks
The most dramatic setback came in the Catatumbo region near Colombia's border with Venezuela. In January 2025, intense violence erupted involving the ELN and a rival FARC dissident faction in an area that is strategically important to the cocaine economy.
The fighting killed scores of people and forced tens of thousands from their homes. Petro suspended negotiations with the ELN on January 17, saying the group had demonstrated that it lacked a commitment to peace. The government subsequently reinstated arrest warrants for ELN leaders whose warrants had been suspended during negotiations.
By April, Colombian peace commissioner Otty Patiño said the government had not permanently closed the door to renewed dialogue, but that resuming negotiations would require a significant change by the ELN. At the same time, the administration continued pursuing localized agreements with other armed factions.
The Catatumbo crisis demonstrated a central difficulty facing the peace process: negotiations between the state and one armed organization cannot by themselves resolve territorial wars between rival groups competing for control of communities, trafficking routes and illicit economies.
Colombia's Coca Economy Adds Pressure
Drug production remained another major source of pressure. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime's Colombia coca survey, coca cultivation reached approximately 253,000 hectares in 2023, up from about 230,000 hectares in 2022. Potential cocaine hydrochloride production was also estimated to have increased sharply.
The 253,000-hectare figure therefore referred to 2023, not 2024 as the original version of this article stated. The distinction matters because coca-cultivation estimates are produced retrospectively and should be tied to the year measured rather than the year in which political debate about them occurs.
Colombia also continued reporting large cocaine seizures, illustrating why cultivation, potential production, eradication and interdiction figures measure different parts of the drug economy and should not be treated as interchangeable indicators of policy success or failure.
U.S.-Colombia Counternarcotics Dispute
At the time of the August attacks, Colombia was also approaching an important U.S. decision over its counternarcotics performance. The issue was not simply an informal deadline imposed on Bogotá; it formed part of Washington's statutory annual assessment of major drug-producing and drug-transit countries.
On September 15, 2025, after the events described above, U.S. President Donald Trump formally determined that Colombia had "failed demonstrably" during the previous 12 months to adhere to its international counternarcotics obligations. The decision marked a significant deterioration in relations between Washington and Petro's government.
The U.S. determination criticized increases in coca cultivation and potential cocaine production. Petro and Colombian officials disputed Washington's assessment of their broader counternarcotics record, pointing in particular to interdiction efforts and the human cost borne by Colombian security forces.
The disagreement highlighted fundamentally different views about how progress should be measured. Washington emphasized cultivation and cocaine-production indicators, while Petro's government argued for greater attention to seizures, rural substitution programs and the socioeconomic conditions sustaining coca cultivation.
The situation also reflected wider regional tensions over how governments should confront transnational drug organizations, including debates over the appropriate role of military force. News Fusion 365 previously examined one such dispute when Mexico rejected suggestions of U.S. military action against drug cartels on its territory.
Conflict Economies Extend Beyond Cocaine
Cocaine is only one component of Colombia's conflict economy. Armed organizations operating in different parts of the country have also drawn revenue from illegal mining, extortion and other illicit activities. The importance of each revenue stream varies by organization and territory.
That diversification makes purely counternarcotics responses insufficient to address every armed group. Weak state institutions, limited economic opportunities and inadequate access to public services in some rural areas can leave communities vulnerable to coercion and recruitment by armed organizations.
These dynamics also help explain why control over territory matters beyond drug trafficking. Armed actors can use territorial influence to regulate local economies, restrict civilian movement, collect illicit payments and prevent state institutions or rival organizations from operating freely.
The Humanitarian Cost Became the Central Measure of the Crisis
The consequences for civilians continued to worsen. The ICRC reported in 2026 that 2025 ultimately produced Colombia's most severe humanitarian consequences from armed conflict in a decade.
According to the ICRC's subsequent annual assessment, at least 235,619 people were individually displaced during 2025, another 87,069 were affected by mass-displacement events and 176,730 experienced confinement. The organization also recorded 965 people killed or injured by explosive hazards, most of them civilians, and documented 308 new disappearances.
Those later figures should not be read as information available during the August 2025 attacks. They provide retrospective evidence of how extensively the humanitarian situation deteriorated over the remainder of the year.
What the 2025 Crisis Showed About "Total Peace"
By late 2025, Colombia's experience had exposed major limitations in the implementation of the "Total Peace" strategy without establishing a simple explanation for the country's violence. Negotiations achieved different results with different groups, while fragmentation, illicit economies and territorial competition continued to drive conflict independently of formal talks.
The government increasingly combined negotiation with renewed security operations as ceasefires broke down and some armed groups escalated attacks. The resulting policy was therefore more complicated than a straightforward choice between dialogue and military action.
Subsequent developments made the historical significance of 2025 clearer. The ICRC's later assessment confirmed that the year marked the country's worst humanitarian deterioration from armed conflict in a decade, reinforcing warnings issued while Petro was still pursuing his peace strategy.
For civilians in Colombia's conflict-affected regions, the practical test remained less ideological: whether the state could provide durable security, public institutions and viable legal livelihoods while reducing the power of armed organizations. The events of 2025 showed how far Colombia still was from achieving that goal.
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