Iran's ballistic-missile arsenal became a central part of the direct Israel-Iran confrontation in June 2025, when Tehran launched missiles toward Israel after Israeli forces struck Iranian nuclear, missile and military targets. The exchange demonstrated why ballistic missiles are among the most consequential weapons in the region: they can travel hundreds or thousands of kilometers at high speed, carry substantial warheads and force defenders to make interception decisions within minutes.
On June 13, 2025, Israel launched a large-scale operation against targets in Iran, including the Natanz nuclear complex. Iran responded later that day with ballistic-missile attacks toward Israel. Reuters reported that Israel said fewer than 100 missiles were fired in the initial retaliation, while Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps said it had attacked dozens of targets. Some missiles were intercepted, while others caused damage and casualties.
The missile exchanges took place alongside a wider dispute over Iran's nuclear program. The International Atomic Energy Agency reported shortly before the conflict that Iran had sharply expanded its production and stockpile of uranium enriched to 60% uranium-235. Iran has consistently said its nuclear program is peaceful. The IAEA, however, has said unresolved safeguards questions and reduced monitoring have limited its ability to provide broader assurances about the exclusively peaceful nature of the program.
How a ballistic missile works
A ballistic missile is powered by a rocket engine during the first part of its flight. After launch, the missile accelerates rapidly, rises through the atmosphere and then follows a largely ballistic trajectory toward its target. Longer-range missiles may travel well above the atmosphere before their reentry vehicles descend at very high speed.
That flight profile separates ballistic missiles from cruise missiles. A cruise missile generally remains inside the atmosphere and uses aerodynamic lift and sustained engine power for much of its journey, behaving more like a pilotless aircraft. A ballistic missile, by contrast, receives most of its acceleration early in the flight and then follows a high-arcing trajectory.
The basic sequence is usually divided into three phases:
- Boost phase: the missile's rocket motor burns and accelerates the weapon away from its launcher.
- Midcourse phase: the missile or its separated reentry vehicle travels along the main portion of its trajectory.
- Terminal phase: the warhead descends toward the target, often at several times the speed of sound.
The exact trajectory, altitude and speed depend on the missile, its payload, launch point and target. Range figures should therefore be treated as estimates rather than guarantees: carrying a heavier warhead can reduce how far a missile can travel, while changes to propulsion, airframe design and flight profile can alter performance.
How far can Iran's missiles travel?
Iran has developed one of the Middle East's largest and most varied missile inventories. The Center for Strategic and International Studies Missile Defense Project lists systems ranging from short-range weapons intended for nearby targets to medium-range ballistic missiles capable of reaching roughly 2,000 kilometers or more.
Representative systems include:
- Fateh-110: approximately 200 to 300 kilometers, according to CSIS. It is a road-mobile, solid-propellant short-range ballistic missile.
- Fateh-313: approximately 500 kilometers. Its range makes it more relevant to regional targets close to Iran than to Israel from most Iranian launch areas.
- Qiam-1: roughly 700 to 800 kilometers, according to CSIS assessments.
- Shahab-3: approximately 1,300 kilometers in commonly cited assessments, although estimates vary by variant and payload.
- Emad: approximately 1,700 kilometers. It is derived from the Shahab-3 family and incorporates a maneuvering reentry vehicle intended to improve accuracy.
- Ghadr: commonly assessed at roughly 1,600 to 1,950 kilometers, depending on the configuration.
- Sejjil: approximately 2,000 kilometers. Unlike older liquid-fueled Shahab-family missiles, the Sejjil uses solid propellant, which can reduce launch preparation time.
- Khorramshahr: publicly associated with ranges of roughly 2,000 kilometers, although some variants and claims suggest greater potential range. Independent estimates remain uncertain.
These ranges mean that several Iranian medium-range ballistic missiles can cover the distance between launch areas in Iran and Israel. Depending on the launch point, weapons in the 1,300-to-2,000-kilometer class can also place parts of the Arabian Peninsula, Turkey and other areas of the Middle East within reach. Longer-range theoretical coverage does not mean every target can be struck with the same payload, precision or operational reliability.
Why solid-fuel and liquid-fuel missiles differ
Propulsion is important because it affects how quickly a missile can be prepared for launch. Liquid-fueled missiles such as members of the Shahab family can require more preparation and support equipment. Solid-fuel missiles store their propellant inside the motor, allowing them to be moved and launched more quickly in many circumstances.
That can make a mobile solid-fuel missile harder to locate and destroy before launch. The advantage should not be overstated, however: survival also depends on intelligence, concealment, launch procedures, communications and the opponent's ability to detect and track mobile launchers.
Range is not the same as accuracy
A missile's maximum range says little by itself about how precisely it can hit a target. Accuracy is commonly described using circular error probable, or CEP, which estimates the radius within which roughly half of missiles would be expected to land under specified conditions.
Iran has spent years improving guidance systems and maneuverable reentry vehicles. Newer systems are generally assessed as more accurate than early versions of the Shahab-3. Even so, performance estimates are often uncertain because governments disclose limited technical information and public claims are not always independently verifiable.
Accuracy also matters differently depending on the target. A missile intended to hit a specific hardened military facility requires much greater precision than one intended to threaten a large urban or industrial area.
How Israel attempts to intercept ballistic missiles
Israel uses a layered missile-defense network rather than relying on a single interceptor. Different systems are optimized for different threats, altitudes and phases of flight.
The Arrow family is designed primarily to counter longer-range ballistic missiles. David's Sling is intended for a range of medium- and longer-range threats, while Iron Dome is best known for intercepting shorter-range rockets and other projectiles. U.S. forces have also participated in defending Israel during major Iranian attacks.
No missile-defense system provides guaranteed protection. Defenders must detect a launch, determine the projected impact area, decide whether interception is necessary and then successfully place an interceptor close enough to destroy or disable the incoming warhead. Large salvos can further complicate the task by forcing defenders to track and engage many objects simultaneously.
What happened to Iran's nuclear sites in the June 2025 conflict?
The confrontation that triggered the missile exchanges began with Israeli attacks on Iranian nuclear and military infrastructure. Initial IAEA assessments found serious damage at Natanz. The agency later determined from satellite imagery that the underground enrichment halls there had also been directly hit, revising its earlier assessment that the underground facility had suffered primarily from damage to electrical infrastructure.
At Isfahan, the IAEA reported damage to several buildings associated with uranium conversion and fuel production. In the first days of the Israeli campaign, the agency reported no observed damage at Fordow. That changed later in the conflict when the United States joined the military operation and struck Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan on June 22, 2025.
A later IAEA safeguards report said attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities occurred between June 13 and June 24 and affected facilities containing safeguarded nuclear material. The agency halted in-field verification activities during the fighting and withdrew its inspectors by the end of June for safety reasons.
Iran's nuclear program and the missile issue are related but distinct
Ballistic missiles and uranium enrichment are separate technologies. A country can possess long-range conventional missiles without having nuclear weapons, and possessing highly enriched uranium does not by itself produce a deployable nuclear warhead.
Before the June 2025 strikes, the IAEA reported that Iran had accumulated significant quantities of uranium enriched to 60%, far above the level commonly used in civilian power reactors and closer to the approximately 90% level generally associated with weapons-grade material. The agency described the scale of that accumulation as a serious proliferation concern.
Iran continued to deny that it was seeking a nuclear weapon. At the same time, the IAEA reported longstanding safeguards problems, including unexplained nuclear material associated with undeclared locations and the loss of important monitoring information after Iran removed equipment that had been used for verification under the 2015 nuclear agreement.
Producing sufficient fissile material would therefore be only one part of developing a nuclear weapon. Designing and manufacturing a reliable warhead, integrating it with a delivery system and validating the overall system involve separate technical steps. Public estimates of a theoretical uranium-enrichment "breakout time" should not be treated as equivalent to the time required to produce an operational nuclear-armed missile.
Later developments changed the nuclear picture
The June 2025 strikes did not end international concern over Iran's nuclear program. Subsequent IAEA reporting said the agency's access and ability to account for nuclear material were severely disrupted after the conflict. Iran enacted legislation in July 2025 suspending cooperation with the agency, and verification remained a major international dispute.
Further military attacks affected Iranian nuclear facilities in 2026, while diplomatic efforts over Iran's nuclear activities continued amid renewed regional fighting. As of September 2026, uranium enrichment, inspector access and the status of Iran's stockpile remained central subjects of international negotiations and IAEA scrutiny.
What the missile exchanges demonstrated
The Israel-Iran exchanges showed that the practical significance of a ballistic missile is determined by more than maximum range. Launch preparation, mobility, accuracy, payload, reliability, warning time, missile-defense capacity and the size of a salvo all affect the outcome.
Iran possesses several missile families with sufficient assessed range to reach Israel, while Israel operates multiple layers of missile defense and has received U.S. defensive assistance. Neither fact guarantees a particular result in an individual attack. Some missiles can be intercepted, others can fail in flight, and some can penetrate defenses and cause damage.
That combination of long-range strike capability and imperfect defenses is what makes ballistic missiles such an important element of the continuing security confrontation between Iran and Israel.
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