When Israel launched a large-scale air campaign against Iran on June 13, 2025, the confrontation highlighted a striking military imbalance that could not be explained by population or geography alone. Iran was far larger and possessed substantial missile forces, while Israel relied on a smaller but technologically advanced military, extensive intelligence capabilities, layered missile defenses and long-standing support from the United States.
During the opening days, Israel struck Iranian nuclear and military facilities, senior commanders, air-defense systems and missile infrastructure. Iran responded with repeated ballistic-missile and drone attacks on Israel. Some Iranian weapons penetrated Israeli defenses and caused deaths and significant damage, demonstrating that Israel's technological advantages did not eliminate Iran's ability to retaliate.
How Israel gained freedom of action over Iran
Israeli officials said their aircraft progressively degraded Iranian radar and surface-to-air missile systems and gained what the Israeli military described as aerial superiority over Tehran. That description was an Israeli military assessment rather than an independently established measure of complete control over Iranian airspace.
Iran's air-defense network had already been weakened before the June 2025 war. During an Israeli strike in October 2024, Israel attacked Iranian military targets including air-defense systems. In the June campaign, Israeli aircraft continued targeting radar installations, surface-to-air missile launchers and other defensive infrastructure.
Israel also benefited from intelligence operations inside Iran. Reporting during the conflict described covert Israeli operations involving drones and other equipment positioned inside the country. Because many operational details came from Israeli officials or intelligence-linked accounts and could not be independently verified in real time, claims about specific covert missions required attribution rather than being treated as fully established facts.
Iran's combat-aircraft fleet, which includes many older U.S.- and Soviet-designed aircraft alongside more recent Russian equipment, did not mount a visible challenge comparable to Israel's sustained fighter operations during the opening phase. Israel's fleet of F-15, F-16 and stealthy F-35 aircraft gave it considerably more modern strike capabilities.
Iran's ballistic missiles remained its strongest direct threat
The most important Iranian capability against Israel was not its fighter force but its large inventory of ballistic missiles. Before the war, Iran was widely assessed to possess the largest and most diverse ballistic-missile arsenal in the Middle East, including weapons capable of reaching Israel.
On June 16, the Israel Defense Forces said it had destroyed more than 120 Iranian surface-to-surface missile launchers, which it described as about one-third of Iran's total launchers. The military also said Israeli aircraft had destroyed missiles before launch and attacked missile-storage sites and command centers. These were Israeli battlefield claims and could not all be independently verified at the time.
Iran nevertheless continued launching ballistic missiles toward Israel. Several penetrated the country's defenses, striking populated areas and other sites. Long-range ballistic missiles are primarily handled by Israel's Arrow system rather than Iron Dome, which is designed mainly for shorter-range rockets. David's Sling and U.S.-operated systems provided additional layers of defense during the conflict.
Missile defense also has practical limits. Interceptors are expensive, inventories are finite and no defensive network can guarantee that every incoming missile will be stopped. Iran therefore retained the ability to impose significant costs even after Israeli strikes reduced parts of its launching infrastructure.
Iran's regional network was weaker than in previous years
Iran had spent decades building relationships with armed groups across the region, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza, Iraqi militias and Yemen's Houthis. Those relationships gave Tehran additional ways to pressure Israel and U.S. interests without relying exclusively on direct Iranian attacks.
By June 2025, however, that regional network had changed substantially. Hezbollah had suffered major losses during its 2024 conflict with Israel, Hamas had been severely degraded during the Gaza war, and the fall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's government in December 2024 disrupted an important Iranian regional ally and logistical corridor.
The Houthis in Yemen remained capable of launching missiles and drones toward Israel and attacking shipping, while Iran-aligned groups in Iraq retained the ability to threaten U.S. and allied interests. Those capabilities meant escalation could still spread beyond the direct Israel-Iran confrontation.
Why U.S. support mattered
Israel's military advantage was closely connected to decades of U.S. assistance. Washington supplies Israel with aircraft, precision-guided weapons, missile-defense funding and other military equipment, while the two countries cooperate extensively on air and missile defense.
That relationship became particularly important because one Iranian nuclear facility presented a problem Israel could not easily solve on its own: Fordow, an enrichment site buried deep inside a mountain. The United States possessed a weapon specifically designed for heavily fortified underground targets, the approximately 30,000-pound GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator, carried by the B-2 stealth bomber.
At the time Israel began its offensive, the United States had not joined the Israeli strikes. That changed during the war.
The United States later entered the conflict
On June 21-22, 2025, U.S. forces attacked Iran's nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan in an operation the Pentagon called Midnight Hammer. According to the U.S. military, seven B-2 bombers participated in the main strike mission and 14 GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrators were dropped, while Tomahawk cruise missiles were also used.
U.S. officials initially described the damage as extremely severe. The exact long-term effect on Iran's nuclear program was harder to determine immediately, particularly because destroying buildings and centrifuges is different from eliminating technical knowledge, surviving equipment or nuclear material.
Earlier Israeli strikes had already damaged major nuclear facilities. On June 17, the International Atomic Energy Agency said analysis of satellite imagery indicated that an Israeli strike had directly affected underground enrichment halls at Natanz. The agency emphasized that its assessments were being made without on-site inspections during the fighting.
Could Israel achieve all of its objectives through air power?
Israel demonstrated that sophisticated aircraft, intelligence, electronic warfare and precision weapons could allow a smaller state to strike extensively inside a much larger opponent. It also showed that destroying launchers, air defenses and command infrastructure could reduce an adversary's ability to conduct large coordinated attacks.
Those advantages had clear limits. Air strikes could damage nuclear infrastructure and missile forces, but they could not guarantee the permanent elimination of Iran's nuclear expertise or every mobile missile launcher. Nor did battlefield success automatically translate into political change inside Iran.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said during the conflict that the attacks could create conditions for political change in Iran, but there was no evidence during the 12-day war that air strikes produced an organized uprising capable of replacing the Iranian government. Political outcomes depend on factors well beyond military targeting.
What happened next
After the U.S. strikes, Iran retaliated on June 23 by firing missiles at the U.S. Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar. U.S. and Qatari officials said the attack caused no casualties.
A ceasefire took effect on June 24 after 12 days of fighting. The halt followed intensive Israeli strikes across Iran, Iranian missile attacks on Israel and direct U.S. intervention against Iranian nuclear facilities. Reuters reported that the ceasefire brought immediate relief after days of attacks and displacement, although accusations of violations emerged around the time it began.
The conflict ultimately demonstrated both sides of the military imbalance. Israel possessed superior aircraft, intelligence and precision-strike capabilities and was able to operate deep inside Iran. Iran, despite suffering major losses to its air defenses, commanders and missile infrastructure, retained enough ballistic-missile capacity to strike Israeli cities and impose casualties. Technology gave Israel substantial operational advantages, but it did not make the larger strategic contest simple or cost-free.
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