Taiwan’s expanded civil-defense exercises in 2025 brought simulated wartime emergencies into streets, workplaces, hospitals and transport systems, pairing military drills with practical rehearsals for civilians. The exercises reflected Taipei’s effort to improve resilience amid sustained military and political pressure from Beijing, while public-opinion research showed that many Taiwanese still considered a near-term attack unlikely.
The Theater of War: Taiwan Expands Civil-Defense Training
On Kinmen, the Taiwan-controlled island group lying only a few kilometers from China’s Fujian coast at its closest points, air-raid exercises turned ordinary workplaces and medical facilities into simulated emergency zones. Government workers practiced shelter procedures, while medical personnel treated volunteers made up to resemble casualties.
The blood and wounds were simulated, but the purpose was practical: testing how civilian institutions would respond to air attacks, infrastructure disruption and large numbers of casualties during a military crisis.
Kinmen carries particular historical significance. Chinese Communist forces heavily bombarded the islands during the 1958 Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, and Kinmen remained heavily militarized for decades. Today, however, the islands also maintain extensive economic and transportation links with nearby Xiamen in mainland China, creating a distinctive mixture of historical memory, cross-strait commerce and security concerns.
Those competing realities help explain why perceptions of risk on Kinmen do not necessarily mirror the urgency conveyed by Taiwan’s defense planning. Residents can simultaneously remember past conflict, depend economically on cross-strait connections and doubt that another major war is imminent.
Urban Resilience Exercises Bring Preparedness Into Civilian Life
Taiwan significantly expanded the civilian component of its annual preparedness exercises in 2025. Air-raid alerts and evacuation procedures temporarily affected traffic and commercial activity, while emergency personnel rehearsed responses to scenarios involving missile attacks, damaged buildings, fires and mass casualties.
The exercises were designed to test more than whether people could reach shelters. Authorities also practiced medical triage, emergency communications, firefighting, evacuation and continuity of essential services.
During a July 17 air-raid exercise in northern Taiwan, sirens sounded and authorities ordered people to take shelter during a mandatory 30-minute drill. Roads emptied, businesses temporarily halted normal activity and the Defense Ministry distributed emergency instructions. The exercise coincided with Taiwan’s broader 2025 military training cycle.
Such drills do not establish that an attack is imminent. They represent preparedness measures undertaken against scenarios that Taiwan’s government considers serious enough to plan for.
Han Kuang 2025 Tested More Realistic Conflict Scenarios
Taiwan’s annual Han Kuang military exercise was also expanded in 2025. The live-fire phase was scheduled for 10 days beginning July 9, making it longer than previous editions, while more than 22,000 reservists were expected to participate.
The exercises included scenarios involving blockade and invasion, attacks on critical infrastructure and operations in densely populated areas. Taiwan has increasingly emphasized decentralized command, protection of essential infrastructure and the ability of military and civilian institutions to continue functioning under sustained pressure.
The changes also reflected lessons Taiwan’s planners have studied from Russia’s war against Ukraine, including the importance of dispersed forces, drones, resilient communications, civilian preparedness and the continued operation of transportation and medical systems during conflict.
China, officially the People’s Republic of China, claims Taiwan as part of its territory and has not renounced the use of force to achieve unification. Taiwan has operated under its own government since 1949. President Lai Ching-te’s government rejects Beijing’s sovereignty claim and says Taiwan’s future should be determined by its people.
Military Pressure and “Grey-Zone†Activity
The security environment involves more than the possibility of a conventional invasion. Chinese military aircraft and naval vessels routinely operate around Taiwan, and Beijing has conducted major exercises following political events it opposes.
Taiwanese authorities also describe cyberattacks, espionage, disinformation and other influence activities as important security challenges. These are often discussed under the broad term “grey-zone†pressure: coercive activity below the threshold of open warfare.
Claims about particular influence or espionage operations require careful attribution. Taiwanese authorities have investigated and prosecuted a number of military personnel and other individuals in cases involving allegations of spying for China, while Beijing rejects Taipei’s broader accusations that it is systematically attempting to undermine Taiwan through infiltration.
Preparedness for these non-kinetic threats has consequently become part of Taiwan’s resilience planning alongside conventional military training.
Public Opinion Shows a More Complicated Picture
The expansion of preparedness measures does not mean Taiwanese residents uniformly expect war. A March 2025 survey published by Taiwan’s government-funded Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR) found that 65% of respondents considered a People’s Liberation Army attack on Taiwan within the next five years unlikely.
The same survey illustrates why describing the public simply as complacent or unconcerned would be misleading. China’s threat to Taiwan was identified by 33% of respondents as the most serious national-security threat over the next five years, ahead of the declining birthrate and economic stagnation. In other words, many respondents regarded China as Taiwan’s principal security challenge while still judging a near-term military attack to be unlikely.
The survey was conducted by National Chengchi University’s Election Study Center from March 4 to March 9, 2025, using telephone interviews with 1,285 Taiwanese adults. INDSR reported a maximum sampling error of plus or minus 2.73 percentage points at the 95% confidence level.
Views about possible U.S. involvement were also uncertain. INDSR reported that 47% considered U.S. military intervention unlikely if Taiwan were attacked, while the share saying Washington would “definitely†intervene had fallen from 19% in March 2024 to 14% in the March 2025 survey.
Why the 2027 Date Requires Careful Interpretation
Discussion of a possible conflict frequently centers on 2027, but the date is often overstated. U.S. officials have said Chinese President Xi Jinping instructed the People’s Liberation Army to develop the capability to conduct a successful invasion of Taiwan by 2027. A capability objective is not the same as evidence that Beijing has decided to invade in that year.
That distinction matters because military preparedness, political intent and a decision to initiate war are separate questions. Assessments of China’s growing capabilities can justify contingency planning without establishing a timetable for conflict.
The uncertainty is one reason Taiwan’s government is pursuing preparedness across several possible scenarios rather than planning solely for an amphibious invasion. A blockade, missile campaign, cyber disruption, pressure against offshore islands or combinations of military and nonmilitary coercion could present different challenges.
Defense Spending Becomes a Central Policy Question
Taiwan’s preparations extend beyond exercises. In August 2025, the government proposed total defense-related spending of NT$949.5 billion for 2026, equivalent to about 3.32% of projected GDP under the government’s expanded accounting approach. The proposal represented an increase of roughly 23% from the preceding year.
The calculation included spending associated with the coast guard and veterans as well as conventional military expenditure, so comparisons with earlier defense-budget figures require attention to how the total is defined.
President Lai has also set a longer-term goal of raising defense spending to 5% of GDP by 2030. The government argues that greater investment is necessary to improve deterrence and resilience as China modernizes its armed forces.
The scale and composition of additional defense spending remain subjects of domestic political debate. Opposition lawmakers have challenged parts of the government’s spending plans and procurement process while also stating support for strengthening Taiwan’s defenses.
Later Context: Budget Disputes Continued Into 2026
Subsequent developments showed that announcing higher defense spending did not automatically translate into immediate expenditure. By April 2026, Taiwan’s military said delays in approving the national budget were affecting about NT$78 billion in planned defense spending involving procurement, maintenance and training.
A separate multiyear special defense-spending proposal also became the subject of parliamentary disagreement. The dispute demonstrated that Taiwan’s military buildup is shaped not only by external security pressure but also by the island’s democratic budget process and disagreements over priorities, costs and oversight.
Economic Ties Complicate Cross-Strait Risk Perceptions
Kinmen illustrates the complexity particularly clearly. The islands were once a frontline military fortress, yet regular ferry connections and tourism have brought residents into close economic contact with nearby mainland China.
For some residents, that interdependence supports the belief that large-scale conflict would impose unacceptable costs on both sides. Others argue that economic connections cannot by themselves guarantee peace.
Neither position establishes what Beijing will ultimately do. The practical challenge for Taiwan’s authorities is therefore to prepare for severe contingencies while avoiding the assumption that preparedness itself proves those contingencies are inevitable.
What Taiwan’s Drills Actually Show
The fake blood, simulated missile damage and emergency evacuations are visually dramatic, but their significance is more limited and concrete than predictions of an inevitable war. They show that Taiwan is devoting more resources to rehearsing how government agencies, hospitals, emergency workers, military units and civilians could operate during a major crisis.
At the same time, public-opinion data show that perceptions of the threat remain nuanced. A majority in the March 2025 INDSR survey did not expect a PLA attack within five years, even though China remained respondents’ leading national-security concern.
Taiwan’s evolving strategy therefore rests on two ideas that can coexist: conflict is not predetermined, and governments can still prepare for it. The effectiveness of that approach will depend not only on weapons and military exercises but also on functioning institutions, credible emergency planning, public understanding and the ability to maintain essential services under pressure.
0 Comments