Titan Implosion That Killed Five Was ‘Preventable,’ Says Report

The US Coast Guard has concluded that the implosion of OceanGate's Titan submersible, which resulted in the deaths of all five individuals onboard, was "preventable," pointing to the company's "critically flawed" safety protocols.

A comprehensive 335-page report from Coast Guard investigators indicates that OceanGate, the operator and owner of the Titan, neglected to adhere to maintenance and inspection standards for the deep-sea vehicle.

Jason Neubauer, chair of the Coast Guard Marine Board, stated, "There is a need for stronger oversight and clear options for operators who are exploring new concepts outside of the existing regulatory framework."

On June 18, 2023, the Titan submersible vanished in the Atlantic Ocean while descending towards the Titanic wreckage.

OceanGate has expressed its condolences to the victims' families and claimed to have "directed its resources fully toward cooperating with the Coast Guard's inquiry."

Here are five significant insights from the two-year investigation.

OceanGate exhibited 'critically flawed' safety practices and a 'toxic' workplace culture.

The report criticizes OceanGate's safety measures as grossly insufficient. It asserts that the main factor leading to the implosion was the company's neglect in following "established engineering protocols" for safety and testing.

According to the report, there were "glaring disparities between their written safety protocols and their actual practices."

Jason Neubauer, chairman of the Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation responsible for probing the Titan incident, stated, "This marine casualty and the loss of five lives was preventable."

The investigation revealed that the company continued operating the Titan sub despite experiencing several prior incidents that compromised its integrity without properly evaluating its fitness for use.

Loss of the sub's structural integrity led to the implosion.

The sub imploded 90 minutes into its dive after its carbon-fiber hull experienced a catastrophic loss of structural integrity, the investigation concluded.

The report indicates that the crew died instantly after encountering nearly 5,000 pounds of water pressure per square inch.

Carbon fiber had not been utilized in deep diving submersibles before.

It is recognized as unreliable under pressure, and its layers are known to separate in a phenomenon called delamination.

The submersible successfully completed 13 dives to the Titanic in the two years before the incident. However, the Coast Guard criticized the company for continuing to use the submersible without inspecting its hull after several safety issues were identified during monitoring.

Rob McCallum, an expert in deep-water operations from EYOS expeditions, who provided advice to OceanGate from 2009 to 2016, told the BBC that carbon fiber is an unpredictable material.

"When you hear the sounds of that hull under stress, like cracking and popping, that's indicative of damage in the hull, suggesting that the hull is deteriorating," Mr. McCallum commented.

"Therefore, you cannot anticipate taking a vehicle to the same depth repeatedly if it's weaker than during the previous dive and expect it not to fail at some point; it is a mathematical certainty that it will fail," he asserted. "The unfortunate reality is that you cannot know the moment of its failure."

OceanGate employed 'intimidation tactics' to circumvent oversight.  

The report claims that OceanGate deliberately evaded regulatory examination by utilizing intimidation and strategic manipulation.  

In the years preceding the incident, the company "capitalized on intimidation tactics, allowances for scientific operations, and the organization’s positive reputation to escape regulatory oversight," stated the report.  

"By deliberately creating and taking advantage of regulatory confusion and oversight difficulties, OceanGate ultimately managed to operate Titan entirely outside of the designated deep-sea guidelines," it continued.  

The report also implicates Stockton Rush, founder of OceanGate and pilot of the Titan during its ill-fated journey, for playing a role in the tragedy.  

Rush "demonstrated negligence that contributed to the loss of four lives" (in addition to his own), investigators indicated.  

Had he lived, investigators mentioned they would have suggested referring him to the US Department of Justice for possible "criminal charges."  

Chair of the Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation, Jason Neubauer, stated to the BBC that the organization’s structure was "profoundly flawed."  

“One of the most notable takeaways that any business could consider is that if your CEO is also acting as the safety officer and lead engineer simultaneously, it simply becomes too much,” he remarked. “It leads to a concentration of power that results in a lack of checks and balances.”  

In order to avert similar incidents in the future, the Marine Board recommended 14 safety measures to the US Coast Guard and the broader submersible industry.  

Among the most significant recommendations:  

• The US Coast Guard (USCG) should seek "appropriate regulatory oversight" for submersibles.  
• Revocation of ORV (Oceanographic Research Vessel) status for submersibles, mandating compliance with certification criteria under new passenger vessel regulations.  
• Allocating dedicated USCG resources "to provide field support for vessels of innovative design."  

In a statement, OceanGate expressed condolences to the families affected by the tragic event, as well as to everyone "impacted by the calamity."  

"Following the tragedy, the company ceased operations permanently and focused all its efforts on cooperating with the Coast Guard's investigation until its conclusion," it stated.