Chinese President Xi Jinping stood alongside Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un at Beijing's September 3, 2025 military parade, an unprecedented public appearance by the three leaders together. The event commemorated the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II in Asia and gave China a high-profile platform to display both its expanding military capabilities and its diplomatic relationships.
The spectacle generated sweeping descriptions of a new anti-Western bloc. The European Union's foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, for example, described the gathering as evidence of an emerging "autocratic alliance." But the event itself did not establish a formal three-country alliance, and the distinctions among China's relationships with Russia and North Korea remain important. The leaders shared the reviewing stand, while substantive diplomacy documented around the event took place primarily through separate bilateral meetings.
What Happened in Beijing
Xi presided over the parade in Tiananmen Square, where more than 25 foreign leaders were present. Putin and Kim occupied particularly prominent positions beside the Chinese leader. Kim's appearance was especially notable because it was his first visit to China since 2019.
The parade followed the 2025 Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit and several days of intensive diplomacy. Xi held formal talks with Putin on September 2. China later confirmed that Xi and Kim held their own talks at the Great Hall of the People on September 4.
The combination of military ceremony and high-level diplomacy was significant, but it should not be confused with the announcement of a new trilateral defense pact. China and Russia have an extensive strategic partnership, while Russia and North Korea have separately deepened military and political cooperation. China maintains its own longstanding relationship with Pyongyang.
China Used the Parade to Display a Broader Military Modernization
The military display provided one of the clearest public demonstrations of the People's Liberation Army's modernization. According to the Chinese government's account of the parade, equipment on display included hypersonic missiles, unmanned and counter-unmanned systems, directed-energy weapons and electronic-jamming systems.
China also publicly displayed components of its land-, sea- and air-based strategic nuclear forces together as a nuclear triad for the first time. The equipment included the JL-3 submarine-launched intercontinental missile and new land-based strategic missiles.
Those displays demonstrate systems China says are in active service, but a parade cannot by itself establish how individual weapons would perform under combat conditions. Capability, operational readiness and demonstrated battlefield performance are separate questions.
Xi and Putin Emphasized Their Strategic Partnership
Putin's trip to China extended beyond the September 3 parade. During their September 2 talks, Xi and Putin publicly emphasized continued high-level coordination and cooperation between their governments.
According to the Chinese Foreign Ministry's official account of the meeting, Xi said Beijing wanted to maintain close exchanges with Moscow and deepen bilateral cooperation. The statement reflected the increasingly close relationship that China and Russia had developed after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the resulting expansion of Western sanctions against Moscow.
Still, describing China and Russia as a formal military alliance would overstate their publicly documented relationship. Their governments describe the relationship as a comprehensive strategic partnership, and each retains independent interests and foreign-policy priorities.
Kim Jong Un's Visit Renewed High-Level China-North Korea Diplomacy
Kim's presence brought another dimension to the gathering. North Korea had dramatically strengthened its relationship with Russia during the war in Ukraine, including through military cooperation, while China remained Pyongyang's most important longstanding political and economic partner.
Xi and Kim met formally on September 4. According to the Chinese Foreign Ministry's account of their talks, the two leaders discussed China-North Korea relations and emphasized maintaining their countries' traditional ties.
The meeting therefore showed renewed high-level engagement between Beijing and Pyongyang after Kim's years-long absence from China. It did not, however, establish that North Korea was choosing one partner over another or that Beijing, Moscow and Pyongyang had adopted a unified foreign policy.
The Three-Way Image Was Historically Significant, but Not a New Treaty Alliance
The image of Xi, Putin and Kim together was politically significant precisely because it brought three nuclear-armed states with difficult relationships with the United States onto the same reviewing stand. Their governments also share objections to important elements of the U.S.-led international system.
That overlap does not erase substantial differences. China has far deeper economic connections with Western economies than either Russia or North Korea. Beijing also maintains a different approach to the war in Ukraine from Pyongyang, which has developed direct military cooperation with Moscow. North Korea, meanwhile, remains subject to extensive United Nations Security Council sanctions, including measures that China and Russia previously supported.
The parade therefore provided evidence of closer diplomatic alignment and highly visible political solidarity, but not proof of a single integrated China-Russia-North Korea bloc.
Why the Guest List Mattered
The event's diplomatic significance extended beyond Putin and Kim. Leaders from Central Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Europe attended the commemorations, including officials from countries with very different relationships with Beijing and Washington.
The attendance demonstrated China's ability to convene a large group of foreign leaders around an event central to Beijing's historical and diplomatic narrative. It should not, however, be interpreted as evidence that every government represented there had aligned itself against the United States or the West.
Some participating countries maintain important economic or security relationships with both China and Western governments. Attendance at a commemorative event is therefore better understood as one indicator of diplomatic engagement than as proof of bloc membership.
What the Gathering Meant for the War in Ukraine
Putin's prominent reception in China underscored the limits of Western attempts to isolate Russia diplomatically following the invasion of Ukraine. China continued to maintain extensive political and economic relations with Moscow even as Western governments imposed broad sanctions and export controls.
At the same time, China's position on Ukraine requires careful distinction between Beijing's official diplomatic language and Western assessments of its conduct. China has presented itself as supporting a negotiated political settlement and has not described itself as a party to the conflict. Western governments have repeatedly criticized Beijing's economic and technological relationship with Moscow and argued that some Chinese trade supports Russia's war economy.
North Korea's relationship with Russia is different. Moscow and Pyongyang developed direct defense cooperation under their 2024 comprehensive strategic partnership, adding a military dimension that is not equivalent to China's relationship with Russia.
Economic Cooperation Does Not Yet Amount to a Unified Alternative System
China and Russia have expanded trade conducted in their national currencies and sought to reduce exposure to Western financial restrictions. Russia's isolation from many Western markets accelerated that shift after 2022.
Claims that China, Russia and North Korea had already created a unified alternative to institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank or SWIFT nevertheless go beyond what the September 2025 gathering established. China participates extensively in the existing international financial system and remains deeply integrated into global trade.
The more defensible conclusion is narrower: governments facing U.S. or European restrictions have incentives to develop payment channels, trading relationships and supply networks that reduce their vulnerability to Western sanctions. How far those mechanisms can substitute for established global systems varies substantially by country and sector.
Later Developments Showed Both Cooperation and Limits
The relationships highlighted in Beijing continued after the parade. Chinese and North Korean officials held additional high-level meetings later in September 2025, while China and Russia continued their regular leadership diplomacy.
At the same time, subsequent diplomacy reinforced why the September gathering should not be treated as the birth of a single three-state alliance. Each relationship continued to operate through its own agreements, interests and negotiating channels rather than through a publicly established trilateral command or treaty structure.
By 2026, China was also continuing direct high-level engagement with the United States despite persistent disagreements over trade, technology, Taiwan and security. That broader diplomacy illustrates Beijing's effort to maintain relationships across competing parts of the international system rather than simply withdrawing into a closed geopolitical bloc.
A Powerful Symbol With Important Limits
The September 3 parade was a consequential piece of geopolitical symbolism. Xi demonstrated China's growing military capabilities before an unusually broad group of foreign leaders, Putin received a prominent international platform despite Russia's confrontation with Western governments, and Kim returned visibly to high-level diplomacy with Beijing.
What emerged was evidence of increasingly important relationships among three governments that frequently oppose U.S. policies—not confirmation of a new formal trilateral alliance. The distinction matters because summit optics do not automatically establish common strategy, treaty obligations or coordinated military decision-making.
The longer-term significance of the Beijing gathering therefore depends less on the striking image of Xi, Putin and Kim standing together than on what their governments subsequently do: the agreements they implement, the military or economic cooperation they deepen, and the areas where their different national interests continue to constrain coordination.
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