One Monday morning in June 2025, Chilean truck driver Javier Gallardo turned on his television expecting the classical-music program that normally accompanied the start of his day. Instead, he encountered battlefield footage carrying the green logo of RT, the Russian state-funded international broadcaster formerly known as Russia Today.
Gallardo's experience, reported by the BBC, came after Chilean broadcaster Telecanal began carrying RT content on its terrestrial signal. The episode became more than a programming dispute: Chile's National Television Council (CNTV) opened regulatory scrutiny of Telecanal's arrangement and later imposed sanctions over several broadcasts. The regulator stressed that foreign programming is not prohibited simply because of its origin, but that Chilean concession holders remain responsible for complying with broadcasting law.
The Chile case illustrates a broader shift in the international information landscape. Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 brought restrictions on RT in the European Union and other Western markets, RT and the Sputnik news agency have continued expanding or strengthening operations elsewhere, particularly in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, the Balkans and parts of Asia. That expansion has occurred alongside funding pressures and distribution changes affecting some Western international broadcasters.
A Heavily Funded International Media Strategy
RT's international expansion is backed by substantial Russian state funding. An analysis by the Centre for Eastern Studies found that RT was allocated 82 billion rubles under Russia's federal budgets for 2022-2024. The same analysis said RT spent a record 31.7 billion rubles in 2024.
The broader Russian state-media budget has also remained large. Russia allocated 137.2 billion rubles to state television, news agencies and newspapers for 2025, according to reporting based on the federal budget. Funding levels demonstrate the priority Moscow places on state-backed media, although expenditure and distribution figures alone do not establish how persuasive those outlets are to audiences.
That distinction is important. An outlet's technical availability, social-media following or potential television reach is not the same as demonstrated audience trust or political influence. Claims about RT's global reach therefore require care, particularly when they originate with the broadcaster itself.
Western Broadcasters Have Also Been Restructuring
Russia's expansion has coincided with retrenchment by some long-established international broadcasters. In 2022, the BBC announced major World Service restructuring as it shifted resources toward digital distribution. Reporting by Semafor said plans included eliminating roughly 50 of 130 BBC Africa positions in London and moving several services away from traditional television or radio formats.
BBC Arabic Radio went off air in January 2023 after 85 years, although the BBC continued Arabic-language journalism on digital platforms. Later that year, Sputnik began an Arabic radio service in Lebanon. The sequence illustrates how a reduction in one broadcaster's traditional distribution can create opportunities for competitors, but it does not by itself prove that audiences automatically transfer their trust from one outlet to another.
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U.S. Allegations About RT's Activities Beyond Journalism
RT's role is contested not only because of its editorial content. In September 2024, the U.S. State Department alleged that the broadcaster had developed capabilities extending beyond conventional media operations, including cyber activity, covert influence operations and procurement support for Russia's military.
The State Department said the Russian government had embedded a cyber-operational entity within RT in 2023 and alleged that information produced through it flowed to Russian intelligence services and other state or proxy organizations. U.S. officials also accused RT of using proxy outlets and undisclosed relationships with online personalities to distribute material while obscuring RT's involvement.
Those are U.S. government assessments and allegations and should be understood as such rather than treated as independently established facts in every particular. RT and Russian officials have repeatedly rejected Western characterizations of Russian international media as illegitimate propaganda operations and have portrayed restrictions on the outlets as censorship.
Africa Has Become a Major Arena
Africa is one of the clearest examples of Russian media expansion. In February 2025, Sputnik opened an editorial center in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, producing material in Amharic and English. Sputnik said it was already distributing radio programming through partner stations in countries including Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, Mali, Guinea and Botswana and discussed plans for additional African-language services.
The expansion takes place in an information environment where foreign influence campaigns are already widespread. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies documented 189 disinformation campaigns on the continent in a March 2024 assessment, nearly four times the number identified in 2022. It attributed 80 documented campaigns targeting more than 22 African countries to Russian actors, making Russia the largest foreign sponsor in its dataset.
That research does not mean Russian media caused every political change in countries where such campaigns operated. Coups, electoral disputes and political instability have complex domestic and international causes. Evidence of coordinated information activity should therefore not be converted into a claim that media exposure alone produced a particular political outcome.
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Why Local Context Matters
Russian international media often presents itself as an alternative to Western coverage, an approach that can resonate where audiences have longstanding grievances over colonialism, Western foreign policy or perceived gaps in international reporting. Those grievances are real political and historical factors; their existence does not mean audiences uniformly accept Russian government narratives.
Russian outlets also adapt their output to regional concerns. In Africa, coverage frequently emphasizes colonial history and criticism of former European powers. In Latin America, RT en Español and Sputnik Mundo devote substantial attention to U.S. foreign policy and regional political disputes. In the Middle East, Russian outlets publish extensive Arabic-language coverage of regional wars and Western policy.
This localization is one reason simple measurements of "pro-Russian" or "anti-Western" opinion can be misleading. Audiences may consume a Russian outlet because it provides free programming, regional coverage or viewpoints they believe are underrepresented elsewhere without accepting every position advanced by Moscow.
Latin America and the Chilean Test Case
RT has maintained a Spanish-language operation for years, giving it an established platform in Latin America. The 2025 Telecanal controversy in Chile demonstrated how Russian programming can also enter domestic terrestrial broadcasting systems rather than relying only on websites, social platforms or subscription television.
Chile's CNTV said on June 20, 2025, that it had requested information about Telecanal's commercial arrangements with RT and was reviewing broadcasts under Chilean television law. Subsequent CNTV records show sanctions against Telecanal in connection with multiple programs broadcast during 2025.
The regulator's approach also highlighted an important legal distinction: it said foreign-origin programming was not prohibited as such and that its oversight was conducted after transmission rather than through prior censorship. The dispute centered on the concession holder's responsibilities and whether particular broadcasts complied with Chilean law.
RT Academy and the Training of Foreign Journalists
Russia's international media strategy also includes journalist training. RT Academy has offered programs to reporters, bloggers and other media professionals from Africa and, subsequently, other regions.
A 2025 BBC investigation into an RT Academy course for African journalists reported that an instructor rejected established findings about two extensively investigated events: the 2018 chemical attack in Douma, Syria, and the killing of civilians in Bucha, Ukraine, in 2022.
On Douma, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons concluded in 2023 that there were reasonable grounds to believe a Syrian Arab Air Force helicopter dropped cylinders containing toxic chlorine gas on residential buildings on April 7, 2018, killing 43 named people and affecting dozens more.
On Bucha, Russian authorities have repeatedly denied responsibility and promoted claims that the killings were staged. Those claims conflict with extensive independent evidence. The UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine documented the killing of 73 civilians in Bucha while Russian troops controlled the town from March 5 to March 30, 2022, while continuing to corroborate additional cases.
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Media Presence Is Not the Same as Political Control
The growth of RT, Sputnik and Russian-linked information networks is measurable, but assessing their political effect is more difficult. Exposure to a broadcaster does not prove that it changed a person's views, and the presence of Russian media in a country does not establish that Moscow caused that country's diplomatic decisions, election results or domestic instability.
The same caution applies to United Nations voting. Governments that abstain from or oppose resolutions concerning Russia may do so for numerous reasons, including security relationships, trade, historical ties, domestic politics, non-alignment traditions and broader disagreements with Western foreign policy. Media influence may form part of that environment, but voting patterns alone cannot demonstrate causation.
An Expanding Information Competition
The broader trend is nevertheless clear: Russia continues to devote substantial resources to international media and influence activity, particularly outside the Western countries where RT has faced bans or other restrictions. Its strategy combines conventional broadcasting, local-language content, partnerships, social platforms, journalist training and, according to Western governments, covert influence techniques.
At the same time, parts of the Western international broadcasting system have undergone budget cuts and shifts toward digital distribution. Those decisions do not automatically hand audiences to Russian outlets, but they can change which sources are easily available in particular languages and markets.
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What the Competition Means for Audiences
The central issue is not simply whether Russian or Western broadcasters have the larger footprint. It is whether audiences have access to multiple independent sources, transparent information about who finances and controls those sources, and reporting that clearly distinguishes verified facts from government claims and political narratives.
The experience of Javier Gallardo in Chile is useful precisely because it shows how quickly an international information contest can become local. A viewer expecting a familiar domestic schedule suddenly encountered programming from a foreign state-funded broadcaster, while regulators and broadcasters debated the legal and editorial responsibilities surrounding that transmission.
Russia's international media expansion is therefore best understood not as proof that Moscow has "won" global public opinion, but as part of a sustained competition for attention and influence. RT and Sputnik have expanded their infrastructure and partnerships in important regions, while governments, regulators, journalists and audiences continue to debate how state-backed international media should be identified, scrutinized and understood.
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